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Classical communication schemes that exploit wave modulation are the basis of the information
era. The transfer of information based on the quantum properties of photons revolutionized these
modern communication techniques. Here we demonstrate that also matterwaves can be applied for
information transfer and that their quantum nature provides a high level of security. Our technique
allows transmitting a message by a non-trivial modulation of an electron matterwave in a biprism
interferometer. The data is encoded by a Wien filter introducing a longitudinal shift between
separated matterwave packets. The transmission receiver is a delay line detector performing a
dynamic contrast analysis of the fringe pattern. Our method relies on the Aharonov-Bohm effect
and has no light optical analog since it does not shift the phase of the electron interference. A passive
eavesdropping attack will cause decoherence and terminating the data transfer. This is demonstrated
by introducing a semiconducting surface that disturbs the quantum state by Coulomb interaction
and reduces the contrast. We also present a key distribution protocol based on the quantum nature
of the matterwaves that can reveal active eavesdropping.
INTRODUCTION
Major foundations of quantum physics are uncertainty,
randomness and entanglement. In the last decades, fas-
cinating quantum information science schemes were de-
veloped based on those properties using photons, atoms,
molecules or ions [1–3]. Exploiting this quantum be-
havior, generated e.g. in a parametric down conversion
source [4], led to major achievements in quantum optics,
including the violation of Bell inequality [5], quantum
teleportation [6] and quantum computing [7] or secure
data transmission such as quantum cryptography [8].
An other quantum cornerstone, the wave-particle du-
ality, generated various matterwave experiments and ap-
plications for electrons [9], ions [10], atoms [11], molecules
[12] and neutrons [13]. It was shown that almost any clas-
sical wave phenomenon has its counterpart realization
with matterwaves leading to particle interference [14] and
Bragg scattering [15] of matter on light gratings, atomic
Mach-Zehnder interferometer [16], transmission of elec-
trons on bulk structures for tomography [17] or even an
atom laser by releasing atoms from a Bose-Einstein con-
densate [18]. However, matterwaves have yet not been
exploited as carrier waves for the modulation and trans-
mission of a signal, as it is common for classic electromag-
netic data transfer. Extending such methods to quantum
matterwaves has the potential of a significant improve-
ment in security and may opens the door for a new type
of communication scheme. The realization of non-local
quantum information transducing architectures based on
matterwaves was yet not possible due to a lack of a suit-
able transmitter element.
In this paper we demonstrate such an approach,
where a message is transmitted by a non-trivial quantum
modulation of an electronic matterwave. It cannot be
realized with classical particles or light. We introduce
and experimentally realize a unique information transfer
scheme that is fundamentally different to the current
quantum information science techniques with photons
[19]. The matterwaves of electrons in a biprism inter-
ferometer [9, 20–25] are used as the carrier waves to
be modulated for signal transmission. The coherent
electron beam is generated by a nanotip field emitter
[26–28] and separated by a biprism fiber into two partial
waves. After superposition by a quadrupole lens, an
interference fringe pattern is formed on a delay line
detector with a high spatial and temporal resolution
[29]. Due to the limited energy width of the source, each
detected electron has a slightly different wavelength.
The ensemble of these matterwaves can be described
by a wave packet with a distinct width being the
longitudinal coherence length [30, 35]. With a Wien
filter in the beam path the separated wave packets can
be longitudinally shifted towards each other decreasing
the interference contrast [9, 30, 35, 36] without changing
the classical electron pathways or the phase of the fringe
pattern. The Wien filter modulation is based on the
Aharonov-Bohm effect on charged particle waves and
therefore has no counterpart with photons or neutral
atoms. The signal to be transmitted is encoded binary
on the matterwave with the Wien filter by switching
between high and low contrast. In this way, neither the
beam position or total intensity, nor the interference
phase are changed revealing it as a truly quantum
modulation dependent on the electrons wave nature.
The data readout is realized by a dynamic contrast
measurement. A transfer rate of 1 bit per 5 s was
achieved with a transmission distance in the centimeter
range until overlap of the separated beams. The total
transmission length to the detector was 14 cm. The
signal transmission is demonstrated to be secure for de-
cohering interceptions by introducing a semiconducting
plate parallel to the electron beam paths. The Coulomb
interaction between beam electrons and image charges in
the semiconductor represents an passive eavesdropping
attempt. The reciprocal action causes a transfer of
which-path information which quenches the interference
fringes due to decoherence [37], effectively annihilating
the communication. We furthermore present a key
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2FIG. 1. a) Experimental setup for the quantum communication in an electron interferometer. The sender encodes the message
on the matterwave with a Wien filter, the receiver decodes it on the detector. A possible eavesdropper intercepting between the
Wien filter and the magnifying quadrupole would cause Coulomb decoherence [37] that shuts down the conversation. b) Sketch
of the Wien filter in the matched mode encoding a binary signal on the spatially separated matterwave packets by longitudinal
shifts between large and small overlap. The corresponding high and low interference fringe contrast is read out dynamically in
a delay line detector.
distribution scheme for matterwaves with similarities
to the BB84 protocol for photons [2]. It can reveal an
active eavesdropping attack based on the quantum wave
nature of the electrons.
RESULTS
The principles of electron biprism interferometry are ex-
plained in [9, 20]. Our setup and its application for com-
munication by matterwave modulation is illustrated in
Fig. 1 a) and b). It includes several beam optic compo-
nents from a former experiment by Sonnentag et al. [37].
A single atom nanotip field emitter [22, 26–28] is the ori-
gin of coherent electron waves. The beam is guided by
two electrostatic deflectors to illuminate the biprism. It
consists of a Au/Pd-coated glass fiber with a diameter
of 395 nm [22] and is placed between two grounded par-
allel plates. The fiber is set on a low negative potential
between 0 and −1 V and can separate the beam coher-
ently up to ∆x = 8.5 µm. The partial waves are com-
bined again by a quadrupole lens [32, 37]. Before they
are superposed at the entrance of a quadrupole magnifi-
cation lens, they pass a Wien filter [30] where the signal
to be transmitted gets modulated on the electron waves
as described below. The beam additionally traverses a
magnetic coil as an image rotator to adjust the edges of
the overlapping partial beams normal to the magnifying
direction of the quadrupole. After superposition, the re-
sulting fringe pattern is magnified by a factor of about
1500 and detected on a delay line detector with a high
spatial and temporal single particle resolution [29].
The non-zero energy width of the beam source ∆E
and the quantum superposition principle allow to de-
scribe the beam with wave packets being the Fourier sum
of individual linearly independent plane de Broglie waves
of single electrons with slightly different energies [9, 30].
The Wien filter is used in classical physics as a veloc-
ity filter and energy analyzer for electron beams [33, 34].
In biprism electron interferometry the unit was rediscov-
ered to correct for longitudinal wave packet shifts [30].
They are introduced by electrostatic deflectors for beam
alignment. The partial waves traverse in regions between
the deflector plates with different electrostatic potentials.
It leads to non-equal group velocities and different arrival
times of the wave packets on the detector. This in turn
results in a longitudinally shifted overlap and a loss of
contrast [9, 30, 35, 36]. When the shift is greater than
the width of the wave packets, defined as the longitudi-
nal coherence length, then the fringe contrast vanishes.
The Wien filter can compensate for this relative delay
and reestablish maximum contrast [30]. It consists of
an electrostatic deflector and two connected magnetic
coils generating a magnetic and electric field both per-
pendicular to each other and the direction of the beam
path (see Fig. 1 a)). The Wien filter is always used in a
matched state where the effects of the electric and mag-
netic forces on the electrons cancel each other. In this so
called matched mode, the Wien filter does not deflect the
beam or shift the phase of the interference pattern, it has
therefore no classical influence on the electrons. However,
the spatially separated partial wave packets still experi-
ence different potentials between the Wien filter deflector
plates which change their relative group velocities. The
magnetic field does not introduce such an effect. For
that reason, a combination of the electric and magnetic
field can always be found to fully compensate the origi-
nal longitudinal shift of the other deflectors in the beam
line and to restore maximum contrast [30] without beam
deflection.
3FIG. 2. Dependency of the interference contrast with the
Wien filter’s deflector voltage in the matched mode for two
different beam path separations, ∆x = (2.9± 0.4) µm (blue
crosses) and ∆x = (3.8± 0.4)µm (red circles). The data is
fitted by Gaussian distributions (solid blue and chain dotted
red line). Insets: The determined electron fringe pattern on
the detector for low contrast state 1 (left, point A) and high
contrast state 2 (right, point B) in the signal transmission
process.
In this paper, we use this mechanism to switch be-
tween two states in the Wien filter for binary signal trans-
mission. The state 2 provides a full longitudinal overlap
of the separated wave packets on the detector and max-
imal contrast. For state 1, a voltage on the Wien filter
deflector is applied (and the according current through
the magnetic coils for a matched state) to longitudinally
shift the wave packets towards each other slightly less
than the coherence length. This results in a significantly
reduced interference contrast. The two states and the de-
pendency of the measured electron interference contrast
as a function of the matched Wien filter deflector voltage
is shown in Fig. 2 for two different beam path separa-
tions. The two insets indicate the interference pattern
visible on the detector at those points (labeled as A and
B in Fig. 2) which are switched for the binary encoding
in the signal transmission. They reveal also the constant
phase position of the fringe pattern.
With this setup the first proof-of-principle experi-
ment for information transfer by matterwave modulation
was performed. The results are presented in Fig. 3. A
user interface was coded where we input the message
”Matterwave modulation”. It was transmitted from
the sender (Wien filter) to the receiver (detector) as
indicated in Fig. 1. The program converts every letter
in its binary representation and sends it to the control
unit for the Wien filter. It consists of a pair of bipolar
voltage sources for the Wien deflector, a bipolar current
source for the Wien coils and a micro controller. For the
binary number ”1”, the deflector voltage and coil current
were set to state 2 (point B), for the binary number
”0” they were set to state 1 (point A), as indicated in
Fig. 2. At these two points, the corresponding high
or low contrast fringe pattern were recorded. Each
interferogram reveals a particle event integration over
one second. This time binning is a balance between
the count rate and the signal transmission rate. To
avoid errors, enough counts are needed to make sure the
contrast and phase can be determined. Thus, 4000 to
5000 counts/s were accumulated on the whole screen,
resulting in 1000 to 1500 counts/s for each recorded
interference pattern within five fringes. It is sufficient
signal to determine the fit parameters and the contrast
with a reasonable accuracy as described in the methods
[24, 28]. The extracted interference contrast is plotted
by the blue curve in Fig. 3. Five time bins are averaged
to form one bit and the averaged values are represented
by black rectangular bars. The message could thus be
transmitted with a rate of 1 bit per 5 sec. To determine
if a bit is ”0” or ”1”, a cut-off value was defined as
(red line): Ccutoff = 0.8 × C¯, with C¯ being the average
contrast of all interferograms in the transmission. The
readout software determines if an individual black bar
value is above or below the red line and interprets it
accordingly to a binary number ”1” or ”0”. Every
transmitted message is initialized by the bit sequence
”000010” to normalize the length of a single bit, before
the start sequence is removed and the first sign begins.
The end of the transmission is defined by the sequence
”110000”. After conversion into letters, the program
reveals the correctly transmitted message, as presented
by the binary numbers and according letters above the
data in Fig. 3.
DISCUSSION
The biprism interferometer is comparable to the famous
double slit experiment in quantum physics [31]. It is well
known that interference effects vanish as soon as the sep-
arated particle waves are measured before getting super-
posed [37–40]. For that simple reason, our transmission
scheme intrinsically includes a high level of security on a
quantum level against passive eavesdropping. Here, we
would like to discuss in more detail different attacks and
why we are the opinion that our quantum wave modu-
lation scheme has a significantly improved security com-
pared to classical transmission.
The experiment has two regions with different levels
of security. The high security communication distance is
between the Wien filter and the coherent partial beam
overlap within or close to the entrance of the magnifying
quadrupole. There, the coherent partial waves have not
overlapped yet, direct measurement by an eavesdropper
will only yield two independent beam spots of electrons
and the modulated common information is lost. The ex-
act distance depends on the amount of fringes needed
for analysis which is related to the width of the superpo-
sition, the superposition angle, the electron wavelength
and the resolution or magnification in the detection pro-
cess. In this experiment it is around 38 mm which is the
distance between the Wien filter’s center and the magni-
fying quadrupole’s center.
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FIG. 3. Interference contrast sequence for the transmitted message ”Matterwave modulation”. The blue curve indicates the
contrast value for every single interferogram per time bin. The black rectangular bars are the average of five time bins, defining
the contrast of a single bit. The red line is the cut-off for the contrast to be interpreted as a ”0” or a ”1” by the readout
software. It also translates the bins from binary to letters, revealing the correctly transmitted message on top of the diagram.
The second region with low security is between the
beam superposition in the quadrupole and the detector.
This distance is 102 mm. It can be argued that the
partial waves are already superposed and the fringe
pattern with the encoded information is visible at any
place in different magnifications.
Security based on quantum decoherence:
An eavesdropper in the first (secure) region of the
transmission coming close to the electrons in the quan-
tum superposition state and tapping with any kind
of measuring device, will cause decoherence due to
Coulomb-interaction [37, 41]. This reduces or destroys
the interference contrast on which our binary coding
technique is based on. It is thereby not important
if information about the electron waves is actually
measured by an external observer or could only in
principle be gained from the environment. For that
reason, any conducting surface can represent the effect of
an eavesdropper. The surface atoms (as being the envi-
ronment) can resolve the which-path information of the
electrons if the surface is close enough to the separated
coherent beam paths. We studied and compared this
Coulomb-induced decoherence with current theoretical
models in detail elsewhere [41]. It was also experimen-
tally analyzed in [37, 42] and theoretically discussed
in [43]. Here, we demonstrate such an eavesdropping
attempt by applying a one-centimeter-long doped silicon
surface parallel and below the separated beam lines
before superposition, as illustrated in Fig. 4 a). The
resulting fringe pattern on the detector from the aloof
electron waves with a beam path separation of ∆x =
5.0 µm is shown in Fig. 4 b). Fig. 4 c) plots the
determined interference contrast as a function of the
electron distance normal to the semiconducting surface.
It can be clearly observed that the contrast drops from
about 70% to zero within 5 µm. This represents the
distinct effect of a passive eavesdropper who would be
detected immediately and end the communication. The
process depends on the beam path separation, surface
conductivity and temperature [37, 41, 42].
Matterwave key distribution protocol:
More complicated is to uncover active eavesdropping in
a ”man in the middle” attack. In this scenario, the inter-
ceptor deflects the separated coherent beams before over-
lap and superposes them on his own detector to measure
the high and low contrast interference pattern according
to the transmitted signal. Then, he or she applies a sec-
ond matterwave interferometer and induces an according
interference pattern into the optical axis of the receivers
magnifying quadrupole and detector. With such a tap-
ping setup, the receiver may not determine the presence
of the eavesdropper. However, we present a transmis-
sion scheme using the quantum nature of the electron
wavepackets to reveal such an attack and accomplish se-
cure data transfer. Our method has similarities to the
BB84 protocol for quantum key distributions with pho-
tons [2]. It utilizes the symmetry of the curve in Fig. 2,
where the contrast value at the indicated point C is equiv-
alent to the one at point A. It leads to two possibilities
how a ’0’ can be encoded, which an eavesdropper can-
not distinguish. Let’s assume for this scheme that point
A and C in Fig. 2 are set further away from the center
of the Gaussian curve such as illustrated by the points
0− and 0+ in Fig. 5. They have the same zero contrast
value within the error as any other point in the back-
ground far away from the wave packets overlap. We also
assume an equal negative and positive Wien filter shift
∆ between minimal contrast at point 0− or 0+ and the
maximum contrast at perfect wave packets overlap (point
B in Fig. 2 or point 1 in Fig. 5). The positions where the
5FIG. 4. The effect of an eavesdropper interfering with the
communication. a) A semiconducting doped silicon surface
is introduced perpendicular to the biprism fibre direction at
the lower image edge into the beam path before superposi-
tion. b) Determined fringe pattern on the detector. The
bright region indicates the surface. The proximity of such
a conducting device decreases the interference contrast due
to Coulomb-induced decoherence [37, 41–43]. c) The fringe
contrast is plotted versus the vertical distance between the
surface and the electrons in the superposition state.
partial wave packets are shifted by ±2∆ from max. over-
lap are labeled as 0−− and 0++.
For our matterwave key distribution scheme, let’s as-
sume the implementation of a second Wien filter for sig-
nal encoding at the sender (Ws) and a further one at
the receiver’s end (Wr), directly before the magnifying
quadrupole. Ws encodes the message by shifting the wave
packets by ±∆ or leaving it as it is. The receiver’s Wr
randomly does the same (±∆ or no shift). After sev-
eral turns, the sender and receiver exchange via a public
channel for each bit how they have shifted (but not if they
sent or measured a ’0’ or a ’1’). They use only those bits
as an encryption key, where both did no shift, or where
they did the opposite shift. This way, the receiver re-
verses the shift of the sender and measures the originally
transmitted bit. For completeness it is worth to mention
that in principle the first and second Wien filter of the
sender can be combined to one Wien filter.
As a next step, the sender and receiver publicly ex-
change the remaining sent/received bits (or a separate
small subset of the data) together with the applied shifts.
Comparing the results are used to reveal a possible eaves-
dropper. To provide an example, if the sender sends a
”1” (max. contrast) and shifts it with Ws by −∆ to a ’0’
bit at point 0− (see Fig. 5) and the receiver chooses to
shift with Wr also by −∆, he will end up at point 0−−
and measure a ’0’ bit (min. contrast). If an eavesdrop-
per is in line and chooses ’no shift’ in the Wien filter,
FIG. 5. Schematic illustration of the interference contrast
vs. Wien filter deflector voltage from Fig. 2 to indicate the sig-
nal encoding points in the matterwave key distribution pro-
tocol. The shift between the separated wave packets from
max. to min. contrast is ∆. The positions 0−−, 0−, 0+ and
0++ indicate the points at multiples of ∆ in both directions.
he or she measures a ’0’ not knowing if it was sent as a
0−−, 0−, 0+ or 0++. In case he chooses to send it as a
0+ the receiver (after subtracting ∆) will end up at the
max. of the contrast curve at point ’1’ and measure a ’1’
bit. Since this is the opposite value as without the eaves-
dropper this interception can be revealed after the public
data comparison. All possible setting on the sender and
receiver site are summarized in Table I.
It also demonstrates the large uncertainty an eaves-
dropper has. If Table I is considered a 3×3 matrix with
the elements (row nr., column nr.) the three cases for
the eavesdropper (E) can be analyzed in more detail:
Case 1, (E) has set his Wien filter on ”no shift” (no):
(E) measures a 0: it could be (11), (12), (21), (23), (32),
(33). (E) measures a 1: it could be (13), (22), (31).
Case 2, (E) has set his Wien filter on −∆:
(E) measures a 0: it could be (11), (12), (13), (21), (22),
(31), (33). (E) measures a 1: it could be (23), (32).
Case 3, (E) has set his Wien filter on +∆:
(E) measures a 0: it could be (11), (13), (22), (23), (31),
(32), (33). (E) measures a 1: it could be (12),(21).
For that reason, even in the best case when (E) mea-
sures a ’1’, he or she has only a 50-50 chance to correctly
forward the bit to the receiver. Without the information
about the applied shifts from the sender, the eavesdrop-
per cannot decode the transmitted sequence.
One final loophole that may be discussed is when the
transmission is performed with significantly more signal
than required for a contrast determination, (E) could
manage to completely capture all signal in an active at-
tack and also to coherently split the beam multiple times.
This would allow to connect several interferometers that
are set on all possible wave packet shifts (−∆, ’no’, +∆).
After the public exchange of the sender and receivers shift
setting, (E) could decode the message. However, (E) still
had to decide which state to forward to the receiver dur-
ing transmission and will do this wrongly in several cases.
For that reason, also in this case our key distribution pro-
tocol would reveal the presence of the interceptor.
60− 1 0+
−∆ 0−− →
−∆ 0−−−
no 0−−
+∆ 0−
0− →
−∆ 0−−
no 0−
+∆ 1
1→
−∆ 0−
no 1
+∆ 0+
no 0− →
−∆ 0−−
no 0−
+∆ 1
1→
−∆ 0−
no 1
+∆ 0+
0+ →
−∆ 1
no 0+
+∆ 0++
+∆ 1→
−∆ 0−
no 1
+∆ 0+
0+ →
−∆ 1
no 0+
+∆ 0++
0++ →
−∆ 0+
no 0++
+∆ 0+++
TABLE I. Possible combinations of wave packet shifts from
the sender and receiver for the matterwave key distribu-
tion protocol and the corresponding bit measurement. The
columns are labeled by the points 0−, 1 or 0+ (see Fig. 5)
where the sender sends the original bit ’0’ or ’1’ with the first
Wien filter. The rows provide the possible shifts (−∆, ’no’
(no shift) and +∆) for signal encoding with the sender’s sec-
ond Wien Filter Ws. The first value in the boxes provides the
signal state after the encoding by the sender (0−− to 0++)
and behind the arrow the receivers states after the decoding
shifts by Wr of −∆, ’no’ and +∆.
It needs to be mentioned that there is still an im-
portant difference between our matterwave scheme and
quantum protocols with photons such as BB84 [2]. The
BB84 protocol is based on the uncertainty in the mea-
surement of the single photon quantum state. Our
scheme depends on the quantum nature and symmetry
of a matterwave packet and therefore is based on the sin-
gle particle interference visible in a multiparticle fringe
pattern. However, our security argument is still based on
a single-particle quantum effect. The message is encoded
in the interference that relies on the wave nature of each
electron interfering with itself. It forms a full interference
pattern as a probability distribution that is dependent on
the Wien filter settings (binary number 0 or 1). As dis-
cussed and demonstrated, an eavesdropper introduces de-
coherence that in turn destroys the wave features of each
electron individually. They cannot form a wave-packet
anymore and our whole information transfer scheme and
key distribution protocol breaks down. The more the in-
terceptor interferes to get information the more informa-
tion is lost due to his disturbance of the quantum system.
This in turn reduces the contrast of the individual single
electron quantum probability distribution. As a conse-
quence, the interference pattern and the communication
are interrupted. In the final readout process we need to
sum over an ensemble of particles to reveal this distribu-
tion. Here lies also a major difference in our technique
towards single photon protocols, and maybe also a small
drawback. To reveal the information (the interference
contrast) encoded in every electron’s probability distri-
bution, the measurement of a certain amount of particles
is required. For that reason, the electron count rate of the
source needs to be calibrated and known by the receiver
to a avoid a coherent and undetected beam splitting by
an eavesdropper.
The single particle character can further be pointed
out in a thought experiment where already a single elec-
tron in an idealized interferometer with 100% contrast
and strong fringe magnification can (with a certain prob-
ability) detect an eavesdropper. The probability distri-
bution in such an interferometer would predict a few clear
dark and bright fringes. If our setup is set to send a ”1”-
bit (full contrast), and there is no eavesdropper, the elec-
tron will never be measured in the area on the detector
around the centers of the dark fringes minima. In case
the electron is detected there, an eavesdropper tapped
the line and reduced the contrast.
In summary, we give experimental evidence that
the fundamental quantum principles of the electron
wave nature and decoherence significantly improve the
transmission security. Since our Wien filter scheme
does not shift the fringe position on the detector and
the electric and magnetic fields cancel each other, the
coherent separated electron pathways are not altered in
any classical way. For that reason, also the electromag-
netic fields from the electron beams is classically not
varied when switching between ”0” and ”1” making it
impossible to read the information with any classical
measuring device while the partial beams are still
separated. The only change is the group velocity of the
wave packets that classically changes the arrival times of
the particles. However, since the electron emission is a
Poisson distributed statistical process [22], the individual
electron starting time is unknown, making the electron
time differences not accessible. The security aspect of
our scheme is therefore also a direct consequence of the
random quantum tunneling process through the field
emitters Coulomb barrier in the Schottky effect [44].
We show that passive eavesdropping is prohibited due
to the introduction of decoherence [41–43] and active
eavesdropping can be prevented by a key distribution
scheme based on the wave packets symmetry. Further
analysis of the influence on the transmission security of
technical parameters such as interference contrast, count
rate fluctuations, beam separation, noise or electron
energy spread are beyond this proof-of-principle work
and will be the aim of upcoming studies.
Future prospects and technical applications:
Our proof-of-principle experiment has yet a secure dis-
tance which is probably too short for direct technical ap-
plications. It certainly cannot compete with the estab-
lished state-of-the-art photon quantum communication
schemes. They allow secure intra-country distances ac-
cessible with glass fibers [45] or even over long, intercon-
tinental distances via satellite communication [46]. How-
ever, the save signal transmission distance in our scheme
could be extended significantly by increasing the beam
path separation. Coherent electron beam splitting up to
300 µm have been reported [47]. With the same superpo-
sition angle, secure transmission of 3.8 m is feasible with
such a separation with state-of-the-art technology. It can
be further extended to ∼ 6 m by positioning the Wien fil-
ter closer to the tip, even between the tip and the biprism
7[30]. Also, the data transfer rate has the potential to be
improved significantly. We have been conservative with
our signal rate, to preserve our source. However, driving
our system to the maximum could increase the transmis-
sion rate by at least an order of magnitude. Optimizing
the whole setup and the electron beam sources [22] can
potentially gain another factor 100.
Potential applications of our technique are short range
communication in environments, where photons cannot
be applied due to an intensive light background on the
sensors. It is also conceivable that in a low noise envi-
ronment such as in space significantly larger beam paths
separations and transmission distances are realistic.
The quest for novel quantum techniques for commu-
nication is important in various fields of modern science
and technology. Here, we demonstrated in a proof-of-
principle experiment that it is possible to perform a
true quantum modulation on a matterwave for signal
transfer in a biprism interferometer. The information is
transmitted by a longitudinal wave packet shift intro-
duced by a Wien filter. We show that decoherence plays
an important role for the security aspect and present a
matterwave key distribution protocol to prevent a direct
eavesdropping attack. It is also emphasized that the
Wien filter has no light wave optical analog. It has an
electron optical refractive index of one [9] and is able to
shift the wave packets longitudinally without shifting
the transverse phase of the fringe pattern in contrast to
light optics. This is a result of the compensating phase
shifts from the magnetic and electric Aharonov-Bohm
effects [9] for charged particles. For that reason, our
scheme cannot be performed with laser light nor with
neutral atoms and presents a unique method for electron
waves. It is a separate class of information transfer
technique based on matterwave quantum features and
indicates significant improvement in safety compared to
classical communication.
METHODS
We apply the Wien filter to shift the wave packets of the
separated beam paths as described in detail in [28, 30].
The Wien filter introduces a longitudinal shift of ∆y =
L∆xUWF
2DUtip
, where L is the length of the Wien filter deflec-
tor plates, ±UWF the applied voltage, D is the distance
between them and Utip the electron acceleration voltage
[28]. The longitudinal coherence length is the width of
the wave packets and can be calculated with lc =
2Utip λ
pi∆E ,
with λ being the electron de Broglie wavelength at Utip
[28].
The following parameters were applied for the sig-
nal transmission in Fig. 3: L = 11.75 mm, ∆x =
(2.9± 0.4) µm at a biprism voltage of −0.104 V and a
combining quadrupole voltage of −15.9 V, D = 8.75 mm,
Utip = 1000 V, λ = 38.8 pm, ∆E = (377± 40) meV, lc =
(66± 7) nm. The distances from the tip to the biprism,
combining quadrupole (center), Wien filter (center) and
magnifying quadrupole (center) have been dtip−bp =
83 mm, dtip−QP1 = 125 mm, dtip−WF = 237 mm and
dtip−QPmag = 275 mm, respectively. For state 2 (high
contrast) and state 1 (low contrast) the Wien filter de-
flector voltages UWF high = −15 V and UWF low = −45 V
were set. The wavepackets are shifted by ∆y = 58 nm at
each state change. The corresponding currents in the
Wien filter coil are set in a way that the beam deflection
vanishes and the Wien filter is in the matched state. The
whole setup is in an ultrahigh vacuum at a pressure of
1× 10−10 mbar and shielded by a mu-metal tube.
For every deflector voltage in the Wien curve of
Fig. 2, five pictures with 250.000 particle events each
were taken and averaged. Every single measurement
lasts only approximately one minute to avoid long-term
drifts. The contrast value data points in Fig. 2 and
Fig. 3 were determined by summing up the signal along
the fringe direction to form a histogram. The fit func-
tion I(x) = I0 ·
(
1 + C · cos( 2pixs + φ0)
) · sinc2( 2pixs1 + φ1)
was then applied as described in more detail elsewhere
[24, 28]. Here, C describes the interference contrast and
s the fringe distance. Further fitting parameters are the
phases φ0, φ1, the average intensity I0 and the width of
the interference pattern s1.
For the contrast analysis in Fig. 4 c), the interfer-
ence was determined as a function of the surface distance.
Each contrast point is evaluated by slicing a horizontal
rectangular section of the image normal to the fringe ori-
entation with a height of 400 nm. The counts in each slice
were summed up to form a histogram that was fitted with
the above function. The contrast was normalized to the
undisturbed value at distances higher than 20µm to the
semiconducting surface.
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